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ISSUES RAISED IN VIEW OF THE STATE'S RESPONSE

I.

Whether to raise the affirmative defense of self defense or defense of another a
defendant must how that the harm to be avoided was bodily injury or if the
prevention of a felony suffices.

II.

Whether State v. Rodriguez, 93 Idaho 286 (1969) was wrongly decided when it
required a fear of great bodily harm for a self defense instruction in a homicide
case.

III.

Whether an appellate court may make its own factual findings and determine what
reasonable inferences arose based on the evidence presented to the trial court
when determining whether a jury instruction should have been given.

IV.

Whether a trial court is called upon to weigh evidence when determining whether
a jury instruction may be given.

V.

Whether conceiving a child with another, standing by itself, and regardless of
legal findings removing the parent-child relationship for one of the parents, is
"having a child in common" for purposes of the domestic violence statute.
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ARGUMENT
I.

A.

The Law of Self Defense
The state argued in its response in this matter that the defendant's understanding of self

defense law is incorrect. The state reads the Court of Appeals opinion in State v. Hansen, 133
Idaho 323,329 (Ct.App.1999), to mean that "a fear of bodily harm is required for a battery to be
justified." The actual passage in the opinion states:
Accordingly, it was not necessary that there be evidence that Hansen reasonably
feared great bodily harm in order to warrant a self-defense instruction. Rather,
evidence of reasonable fear of some level of bodily harm will suffice. FN6
FN6. The distinction between the fear of death or great bodily harm that is
necessary to justifY a homicide, and the requirement of only a fear of some bodily
harm to substantiate self-defense in a prosecution for battery is incorporated in
Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction 1517. It provides for inclusion of the term "death
or great bodily harm" or only "bodily harm," depending upon whether the
prosecution is for homicide or for battery.
Jd. There is of course a difference between that which suffices and that which is necessary.

Perhaps more to the point is the state's reading of State v. Rodriguez, 93 Idaho 286 (1969), where
the Idaho Supreme Court, interpreting I.C. § 18-4009(1), held that fear of great bodily injury was
a prerequisite for homicide, rather than simply resisting the commission of a felony.
Rodriguez has never been explicitly overruled. However, the pattern jury instruction for
justifiable homicide does not match the ruling. It states:
[committed in defense of habitation, property or person, against one who
manifestly intends or endeavors, by violence or surprise, to commit a felony, or
against one who manifestly intends and endeavors, in a violent, riotous or
tumultuous manner, to enter the habitation of another for the purpose of offering
violence to any person therein. However, the bare fear of such acts is not
- 2-

sufficient unless the circumstances are sufficient to create such a fear in a
reasonable person and the defendant acted under the influence of such fears
alone.]
[committed in the lawful defense of the defendant, or of a wife or husband, parent,
child, master, mistress or servant of the defendant, when there is reasonable
grounds to apprehend a design to commit a felony or to do some great bodily
injury and imminent danger of such design being accomplished; but such person,
or the person on whose behalf the defense was made, if that person was the
assailant or engaged in mortal combat, must really and in good faith have
endeavored to decline any further struggle before the homicide was committed.
However, the bare fear of such acts is not sufficient unless the circumstances are
sufficient to create such a fear in a reasonable person and the defendant acted
under the influence of such fears alone.]
[when necessarily committed in attempting, by lawful ways and means, to
apprehend any person for any felony committed, or in lawfully suppressing any
riot, or in lawfully keeping and preserving the peace.]
I.C.J.I. 1514. This language follows I.C. 18-4009(1). Thus this Court may need to determine
whether Rodriguez was wrong, or simply that it was not asked to reflect upon a situation
involving the prevention of a felony or capture of one who has committed a felony.
Then again, this is not a case involving homicide. Hansen does not hold that self defense
cannot be used to prevent a felony. The laws and Constitution of the state of Idaho all state that
self defense may be used to prevent a felony. See IDAHO CONSTITUTION art. I § 1; I.C. §§ 184009,18-4010,18-4013; 19-202A.
Perhaps more questionable is the state's argument that kidnapping does not create a
reasonable fear of bodily injury. There probably are kidnappings where the kidnapped suffers no
bodily harm. See O. Henry, The Ransom of Red Chief (l 907). But for the vast majority of
people, having your child essentially stolen by another person creates much anxiety precisely on
the subject of bodily harm. Certainly, that was the case in this matter.
-3-

For these reasons, this Court should reverse the lower courts' decisions and remand this
matter.
B.

The Scope of Review on Appeal for Requested Jury Instructions
The state argues in its response that the District Court, in affinning the denial of the

defendant's requested necessity instruction, was simply affirming "a correct ruling by applying
the correct legal standards." The state goes on to say that the defendant did not present authority
and thus waived this claim. The defense sees the matter otherwise. l
First, the defendant took no issue with the "correct application of the law." Rather, the
defendant took issue with the reweighing of the evidence by the District Court. Ironically, the
defendant had argued to the District Court that the Magistrate had improperly weighed the
evidence prior to determining whether to give her requested instruction, only to have the District
Court ignore the argument, reweigh the evidence, and affirm the Magistrate on the basis of the
District Court's view of the evidence. The "correct application of the law" is not at issue. The
facts are.
Second, as to authority, the defendant relied upon the following:
1. In determining whether the trial court should have given a requested jury instruction, this
Court must examine the instructions that were given and the evidence adduced at trial.

State v. Fetterly, 126 Idaho 475, 476 (Ct.App.1994).
2. Generally, issues not raised below may not be considered for the first time on appeal.

State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 195 (1992).

I The state seems to recognize this, since it then argues that contrary to the defendant's argument, the District Court
did not engage in fact-finding.
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3. Where a party appeals the decision of an intermediate appellate court, the appellant may
not raise issues that are different from issues presented to the intermediate court. State v.
Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 275 (2003).

4. An issue is different if it is not substantially the same or does not sufficiently overlap with
an issue raised before the trial court. See id. at 277-78.
5. To illustrate, the Idaho Supreme Court in Sheahan determined that even where the
primary arguments made at trial were that unfair pretrial publicity and community
prejudice deprived the defendant of a fair trial, the trial judge had considered all of the
arguments on the issue of a fair trial made by the defendant on appeal. The Court stated,
"The trial judge recognized and addressed these issues as falling within the factors to be
considered," and thus, they were preserved. Id. at 278. In other words, the issues raised on
appeal, though expanded upon, were substantially the same as those argued before the
trial court.
The District Court reweighed the evidence of whether there was a specific threat of harm.
The Magistrate found that a threat existed. See Tr. Vol. II, p. 233, L. 6-25, p. 234, L. 1-3. The
District Court held, without much discussion, that no such evidence existed. The defense is
unable to understand how, where an appellant raises an argument as to a ruling, the appellate
court may, in the scope of its authority on review, revisit and reweigh evidentiary findings that
were not argued as being improperly found by either party. If the scope of review is simply
to match up the evidence found by the Magistrate with the law, then the District Court clearly
erred. If the scope of review is rather that the appellate court, who was not there, did not hear
evidence, had no basis for determining what testimony was or was not credible, may reweigh the
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evidence presented, then this Court should say so. Since the understanding of the scope of
review as to facts is generally that:
[t ]he appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the trier of fact as to the
credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, and the
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence

State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 104 (Ct.App.1991); State v. Decker, 108 Idaho 683, 684
(Ct.App.1985), it would be extremely helpful to learn that this does not apply when an appellate
court is reviewing whether an instruction should have been given.
Assuming that the scope of review is in fact still the same as to facts and the reasonable
inferences from those facts when reviewing whether instructions should have been given, the
District Court erred. This Court should so find.
C.

The Scope of Review for Requested Jury Instructions by Any Court
The state argues that the Magistrate properly refused the defendant's requested necessity

defense instruction because "whether a reasonable view of the evidence would support giving the
instruction is in fact a matter within the trial court's discretion." The state cites two cases for
support. The first, State v. Bush, 131 Idaho 22 (1997), involved a defendant arguing that he was
entitled to an instruction reserved for cases that only involved circumstantial evidence even
though he had been identified on multiple occasions. The second, State v. Howley, 128 Idaho
874,879 (1996), the Supreme Court found:
the evidence in this case does not support the contention that Collins-Macchio
had the intention of moving to a place in Montana that would pose a specific
threat of immediate harm to Collins-Macchio or her children. We hold that the
possibility of harm at an indeterminate date in the future, is insufficient to satisfy
the first element of the necessity defense, a specific threat of immediate harm.
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While the lack of a specific threat of immediate harm precludes the defense of
necessity, we also note that the evidence in this case was clear that Coelho and
Cox's objective could have been accomplished by a less offensive alternative that
was available to them. The record clearly indicates that no alternative efforts were
made to avoid the necessity of abducting Collins-Macchio.
Neither case is helpful. The defendant is raising the issue of what is meant by "reasonable view"
of the evidence. Bush stands for the proposition that when the evidence is in the record that does
not allow for a particular instruction, then that instruction cannot be given. Howley stands for the
opposite- where no evidence exists, the instruction cannot be given. Certainly, a little weighing
of the evidence must occur to accomplish either finding, but neither case gives license to the
sweeping power assumed by the lower courts in this matter.
This Court should see that evidence existed as to each element that could have been
weighed by the jury to meet the threshold requirement for the defense to exist in this matter. If
this Court finds that more is required, then this Court will give trial courts more responsibility
and power in determining whether to give ajury instruction than is given under LC.R. 29 to
direct a finding of not guilty. See State v. Marsh, 141 Idaho 862 (Ct.App.2004) citing State v.

Carlson, 134 Idaho 389,395 (Ct.App.2000); State. v. Kapsa, 126 Idaho 512, 521 (CLApp.l994);
State v. Mata, 107 Idaho 863, 866 (Ct.App.1984). It may be that the law is not free of absurdities
and inconsistencies, but where, as here, they stand so fully exposed, courts should correct them.
The defendant asks this Court to find that the absurd result requested by the state and created by
the lower courts be found in error and reversed.
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II.
A.

The Significance of Having a Child
In its response

brief~

the state argues that

I.e. § 18-918(l)(a) should be interpreted as it

was by the lower courts to mean that having a child in common is satisfied by two people being
the biological parents. The state argues the language is unambiguous. This is something of a
curiosity for the defense. First, because the statute, read as a whole, does not seem concerned
with DNA. See State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863 (2011) (holding that cohabitating denotes an
intimate relationship such that a father-daughter fight does not meet the definition). Second,
because the Idaho Supreme Court already held in State v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827, 830-31 (2001),
that the statute was constitutional in view of the state's interest in preventing violence between
those involved in some type of domestic relationship. The Court had specifically invoked the
image of people who, due to the law and common experience, will have to deal with one another
on a continuing basis and further that it occur on a "highly emotional level." Id.
Presumably, the state is aware that some birth parents have no relationship with their
child. It is, after all, one of the state's duties to at times sever relationships between parents and
their birth children, and sometimes to track down parents and try to enforce the obligations that
come with giving life to another human being. See generally I.C. § 16-2001 et seq.;

I.e. § 32-

1001 et seq.; I.e. § 32-1101 et seq.; I.C. § 32-1201 et seq.; I.e. § 32-1301 et seq.
Thus, the state's argument, that the domestic violence statute intends to ratchet up
penalties for violence that occurs between people whose relationship only could come within its
ambit on the grounds of being birth parents to the same child, is rather bizarre. Shall the
relationship between the rapist and the raped be ever deemed domestic so long as a child is born
-8-

out of the crime? Is the sperm donor in a domestic relationship with his donees? At what point
does a birth parent, found by a court oflaw to be unfit to be a parent, cease to be considered in a
domestic relationship with the child's parents? According to the state: never. The legislature
unambiguously intended to protect all the above.
The defendant argues that the legislature is more rational than that. He argues that the
legislature sought to prevent domestic violence, which is a pervasive evil in our society, and one
which is recently rather well studied and understood. See The National Domestic Violence
Hotline, www.thehotline.org (last visited April 25, 2014) (defining abuse as a repetitive pattern
of behaviors to maintain power and control over an intimate partner); Oakland County
Coordinating Council Against Domestic Violence, www.domesticviolence.org/ (last visited April
25, 2014) (defining domestic violence as one party's attempt to control another); National
Coalition Against Domestic Violence, www.ncadv.org (last visited April 25, 2014) (defining
battering as a pattern of behavior used to establish power and control over another person with
whom an intimate relationship is or has been shared through fear and intimidation). It is also one
that has nothing to do with a father trying to protect his daughter from her unfit and extremely
dangerous birth mother.
At the very least, a jury ought to be given the opportunity to determine whether the parties
truly have a child in common.
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